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Abstract 
In the context of welfare delivery, hybrid organisations mix public and ‗new‘ market, social, and professional 
types of mechanisms and rationales. This paper contributes to our understanding of accountability within hybrid 
organisations by highlighting how accountability obligations can become hybrid, simultaneously formal and 
informal. Instead of seeing accountability as hybrid only in the sense of the co-existence of types of organisational 
mechanisms and structures (i.e., the prevalence of both state and market types), we examine accountability 
arrangements governing a hybrid model — primary care commissioning in England — and interrogate the 
relationships between accountability actors and their accountability forums. We conceptualise ‗hybrid 
accountability obligations‘ as a state whereby the nature of obligation underpinning accountability relationships is 
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both formal-informal and vertical-horizontal concurrently. The paper concludes by highlighting the consequences 
of this kind of hybridity accountability, namely how it extended discretion from welfare delivery to the domain of 
welfare governance. 
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1 | INTRODUCTION 
The introduction of partnership working, policy networks, service delivery outsourcing, quasi-market competitive 
tendering, and agencification led to layering (Streeck and Thelen 2005) or sedimentation (Olsen 2009) in public 
organisations as ―old and new institutions co-exist and co-evolve even if they are founded on partly inconsistent 
principles‖ (Christensen & Lægreid, 2011, p. 419). In this context, the notions of ‗hybrid‘ and ‗hybridity‘ gained 
traction as conceptualisations of recent developments in welfare delivery (Denis, Ferlie, and Van Gestel 2015; 
Mair, Mayer, and Lutz 2015; Polzer et al. 2016). Nonetheless, scholars argue that research has over focused on 
debating how paradigms co-exist, overturn, replace, or complement each other in hybrid organisations. Additional 
ways of engaging with hybridity are needed as the analytical category of hybridity has been applied inconsistently 
across studies, with some claiming that it lacks conceptual clarity (Mair, Mayer, and Lutz 2015; Polzer et al. 
2016).  
This paper contributes to an understanding of accountability in hybrid public organisations by exploring and 
conceptualising what policy reforms rooted in hybrid logics and intents might do to accountability relations per se 
and whether (and in what way) these becomes hybrid in themselves. To begin a conversation about the possibility 
of seeing accountability itself as hybrid rather than studying accountability within organisational models which 
are deemed hybrid, we examine the ambiguities resulting from an accountability mechanism put in place in the 
recent, radical overhaul of the National Health Service (NHS) in England, following the election of a Coalition 
Government in 2010. Under the Health and Social Care Act (HSCA) 2012, Clinical Commissioning Groups 
(CCGs) – new membership-based, locally-oriented healthcare commissioning organisations – gained 
responsibility for commissioning (or purchasing) health care services for their registered population. The HSCA 
reinforced the place of semi-autonomous agencies in welfare delivery (Overman and Thiel 2016), attempted 
hybridisation of managers and clinicians in healthcare (Mcgivern et al. 2015), and brought conflicts of interest to 
the fore (Boyce and Davids 2009). This organisational change is thus of interest as it shares common 
characteristics with a range of public sector modifications currently affecting Western countries (Turner, 
LourenÇo, and Allen 2016). 
Instead of cataloguing the type of accountability mechanism or commenting on the type of organisational 
response (e.g., whether it is ‗market‘ or ‗state‘ based or whether it is private or public), we focus on accountability 
relationships (Bovens 2007) and highlight how the nature of obligation between actors and their forums became a 
source of uncertainty. We contend that within hybrid public organisations, accountability obligations might be 
modified not only in terms of the co-existence of state and market organisational principles (e.g., using 
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competitive-tendering as an accountability mechanism for public allocation), but also in ways which turn the 
relationships between accountability forums and actors into an ambiguous, almost inoperable requirement. We 
find that hybrid public organisations might affect accountability obligations by informalising formal obligations 
and formalising informal obligations. Furthermore, we observe how, in the case of CCG governance and 
regulation, hybrid accountability obligations led to higher levels of practitioner manoeuvrability and to an 
extension of healthcare managers‘ discretion and agency from the domain of healthcare delivery to healthcare 
governance. As managers developed what they called ‗workarounds‘, their actions extended from the domains of 
their designated practice (the management of healthcare service delivery) into foundational domains of public 
administration such as decisions on what constitutes public and private affairs, what should or should not be 
regarded as a conflict of interest, and how professionals participate in decision-making around public resource 
allocation. The paper, then, contributes by suggesting and demonstrating that efforts to ‗liberate‘ local 
organisations from the perceived burden of bureaucratic accountability with a view to ensuring professional input 
into commissioning decisions has resulted in governance arrangements that are uncertain, allowing discretion in 
areas beyond the clinical, with unintended consequences for transparency, accountability and democratic 
oversight.   
 
2 | HYBRID PUBLIC ORGANISATIONS AND PRACTITIONER ACCOUNTABILITY 
Changes towards hybridity were shown to diminish the centrality of public accountability (Behn 1998; Newberry 
2015) and within hybrid public organisation models accountability now carries a polyphony of definitions 
(Bovens 2007). It is multidimensional (Christensen and Lægreid 2011) and places not always commensurable 
demands on both public practitioners and organisations (Radin 2010), thus leading to challenges to how public 
bodies are held to account, to whom they are accountable, and to the character and scope of accountability 
relationships. The problems of policy implementation are not new (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975), but as the 
shift from government to governance enacts decentralisation and distribution of functions and responsibilities, the 
complexity of policy implementation increases (Agranoff 2007). On the backdrop of managerial reforms, a view 
that ―bureaucratic discretion is the nemesis of accountability‖ (Brodkin 2008, p. 317) is prevalent and 
accountability mechanisms are often advanced as guarantors of better control, legitimacy, cohesion and 
performance (Dubnick and Frederickson 2011). With NPM‘s emphasis on ―hands-on professional management, 
explicit standards of performance, a greater emphasis on output control, and private-sector management 
techniques‖ (Diefenbach 2009, p. 324), oversight shifted from direct, bureaucratic control over processes towards 
the measurement and monitoring of outcomes (Page 2006), and holding to account for performance against these 
measures. However, while formal performance accountability has been promoted as a means of controlling 
practitioners‘ discretion, performance measurement approaches tend to lead to the prioritisation of some goals, 
ignoring others (Brodkin 1997). This approach may also obscure maladministration at the expense of transparency 
at the ‗street-level‘ of practitioners (Brodkin 2008). Consequently, there is recognition in the literature that a 
paradoxical situation has arisen whereby there is an ‗audit explosion‘ (Power 1994) while at the same time there 
is an ‗accountability deficit‘ (Mulgan 2014), with a diminishing capacity of representative democracy to hold the 
executive to account. Hybridity in public organisations compounds this, with uncertainty about accountability 
definitions, relationships, and the location of power. 
  
3 | CONCEPUTALISING HYBRIDITY: TOWARDS A FOCUS ON HYBRID 
ACCOUNTABILITY OBLIGATIONS 
The term ‗hybrid‘ (as a noun) refers to ―a thing made by combining two different elements‖ (OED) arising from 
the Latin hybrida, denoting offspring of mixed breeds, both animal and human. Used to describe the intermingling 
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of species in biology or a combination of languages in linguistics, the notion has analytical purchase for 
conceptualising a type which has to do with two previously recognised classifications. As we are interested in 
exploring hybrid accountability through an analysis of a new welfare delivery system, we turn to expand on the 
classificatory schemes relevant to public accountability proposed by Bovens, Schillemans, and Goodin (2014) and 
Mattei (2016). It is this scheme of categories – specifically pertaining to the phenomena of interest – which we 
would like to suggest hybridity happens ‗to‘ or ‗in‘ (rather than the public/private hybridity).  
Extant research into hybridity in public administration is mainly focused on creating typologies of governance 
according to traditional public administration categories. Hybridity tends to be seen as the mixing together of 
traditional public sector principles, such as Weberian bureaucracy, and those taken from the corporate tradition of 
NPM or newer orientations that favour democratic, horizontal modes of governance (Mair, Mayer, and Lutz 2015; 
Polzer et al. 2016). To illustrate, approaches to hybrid leadership (Fulop 2012) conceptualise it as the mixing of 
distribution and control, whilst approaches to hybrid regulation (Kurunmäki and Miller 2011) tend to 
conceptualise it as the mixing of cooperation-focused policy programmes with restrictive organisational 
boundaries. Hybridity in professional roles in the public sector (Hendrikx and Gestel 2017; Noordegraaf 2015) is 
often seen as the mixing of expert and managerial concerns. In the case of accountability, this focus led authors to 
suggest that public accountability — taken as belonging more to the worlds of bureaucracy and control — is 
supplemented, undercut, or simply co-exists with ‗newer‘ forms of accountability such as market accountability 
or social accountability — taken to belong to the ‗other category‘ of corporate autonomy.  
A focus on paradigms‘ interaction in hybrid organisations only takes the analyst so far, and it has been argued 
that hybridity is applied inconsistently across studies, with some claiming that it lacks conceptual clarity (Mair, 
Mayer, and Lutz 2015; Polzer et al. 2016). In this vein, Polzer et al. (2016) outline various types of hybridity 
according to their degree of separation, change over time and pattern of mixing. Mair, Mayer, and Lutz (2015) 
differentiate between organisational responses of social enterprises, identifying conforming hybrids and 
dissenting hybrids, whilst Battilana and Lee (2014) conceptualised hybridity across organisational dimensions 
(e.g., culture, workforce composition, organisational activities). Our analysis is situated with this second line of 
inquiry, as we are interested in going beyond typologies of public administration terminology and towards a more 
nuanced conceptualisation of hybridity, in our case — hybridity as it relates to accountability obligations per se.  
A central way of approaching accountability is as a mechanism (Bovens, Schillemans, and Goodin 2014). This 
focuses questions on the ―way in which institutional arrangements govern the behaviour of public agents‖ (p. 8) 
and is pertinent for our concern with practitioner agency and its relation to governance. In analytical terms, this 
allows accountability relationships to be analysed based on dimensions corresponding to the following questions: 
Who is the actor being held to account? To which forum is the account given? What is the account about (e.g., 
financial outcomes or processes)? By which standards is judgment made? and What is the nature of the 
relationship between actor and forum? Of the typologies of accountability proposed by Bovens et al. (2014), of 
interest to this paper is the distinction between formal, vertical accountabilities and informal, horizontal 
accountabilities. This distinction relates to questions of policy hierarchy and practitioners‘ discretion as it enables 
exploring accountability relationships between policy actors and their ‗superiors‘ or those ‗above‘ or ‗across‘ in 
the chain of answerability. It orients research towards the management and exercise of agency and proposes a 
framework with which to address questions of hybridity in regards the nature of obligation at the root of 
accountability relationships.  
While public accountability has traditionally consisted of relationships in which the forum is ‗above‘ the actor 
within the chain of bureaucratic answerability and with which relations were explicit, formal and mandatory, 
policy practitioners are no longer held to account solely by their public administration supervisors. They now 
have, or choose, to answer to a plethora of forums. These forums are not directly ‗above‘ the actor, but rather 
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consists of stakeholders that might relate to its activities, such as public representative bodies, or fellow public 
sector organisations that are part of a coordinated welfare system (e.g., social and health care) (Checkland et al. 
2013). The relationship with these latter organisations might be voluntary, and the accounts do not necessarily 
bear formal consequences (Bovens 2007). Some of these relationships have been conceptualised as diagonal 
relationships, i.e. with organisations such as regulators who might wield sanctions in case of performance failure, 
but who nonetheless do not form part of a traditional top-down bureaucratic structure. 
 
[Figure 1] 
 
Below, we suggest that within our case study (a welfare delivery model which combines hybrid organisational 
forms) the nature of obligation at the root of accountability relations as understood along these lines of 
formal/informal and vertical/horizontal has been hybridised, and thus rendered uncertain.  
 
4 | CASE STUDY CONTEXT: REORGANISATION OF PRIMARY CARE IN 
ENGLAND 
Healthcare in England underwent a major reform in 2012. Under the Health and Social Care Act 2012 
(HSCA2012) clinically-led organisations called Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) were set-up across 
England, replacing the managerially-led Primary Care Trusts (PCTs). In effect, the regional, strategic tier of 
planning was abolished and a new national arm‘s length body, NHS England (NHSE) (known in statute as NHS 
Commissioning Board), was created to support the locally-oriented CCGs in commissioning health care services 
(hospital and community services). There were early concerns over potential conflicts of interest associated with 
clinical leadership in the public sector, as primary care doctors could potentially be commissioning services that 
they themselves provide; hence responsibility for commissioning primary care services was given to NHS 
England, although local CCGs were to have influence and involvement to ensure clinical input. 
In practice the commissioning of local primary care services requires local knowledge, and by April 2015 it 
was clear that this was difficult for a national body such as NHSE. Responsibility for commissioning primary care 
services was therefore delegated to CCGs. The changes meant that while the national body NHSE retains statuary 
responsibility for primary care-related welfare functions, their delivery was now delegated to local CCGs. The 
guidance issued (NHS England 2014b) followed a Post-NPM rationale, suggesting that delegating primary care 
commissioning responsibilities to CCGs would harness clinical insight and energy, supporting a holistic and 
integrated approach to population health. These benefits were said to outweigh the risks of conflicts of interest, 
which would be mitigated by developing ‗robust new and transparent [management] arrangements‘. 
 As such, the new system developed in England is a hybrid model of public organisation based on two main 
counts: it instituted hybrid decision-making (managerial, lay and clinical) and a hybrid governance structure (both 
national and local). 
4.1 | Clinical, executive and lay decision-making 
CCGs place clinicians, managers and lay members at the heart of decision-making. One of the reform‘s key aims 
was to ‗liberate‘ professionals from top-down control, giving them more autonomy and, in exchange, making 
them more accountable: 
The Government’s reforms will empower professionals and providers, giving them more autonomy and, in return, 
making them more accountable for the results they achieve, accountable to patients through choice and 
accountable to the public at local level (Department of Health, 2010, p. 4) 
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Delegation of primary care commissioning required the creation of a corporate decision-making Primary Care 
Commissioning Committee (PCCC) inside local CCGs. The national body NHSE published a model Terms of 
Reference for CCGs to use as an example, while leaving the specificities of negotiating the responsibilities of 
each professional group open. The PCCC arrangement is particularly ambiguous as it sits outside of each CCGs 
Governing Body — it is directly accountable to NHSE due to its primary care planning function, while officially 
being a corporate body of the individual CCG organisation.  
4.2 | Local governance framework for both autonomy and oversight 
The delegation of primary care commissioning to CCGs attempted to shift decision-making ‗downward‘ to a local 
level while retaining national oversight and control over health outcomes. This has complicated an already 
―contested, potentially hybrid, and even contradictory accountability framework‖ (Mattei 2016, p. 471) as it saw 
the main bulk of healthcare policy implementation, specification, and operationalisation in primary care in 
England moving from a Non-Departmental Public Body (NDPB) towards local organisations the members of 
which are GP practices – the very providers of the services that are to be commissioned.  
In terms of their accountability to the public, the Government and Parliament, NHSE is responsible for 
overseeing local CCGs‘ performance in the commissioning of services via an accountability framework, the 
Improvement and Assurance Framework (IAF). Figure 2 depicts the governance arrangements within which the 
mechanism is embedded. While NHSE sits ‗above‘ CCGs in the delegation chain and is mandated to hold CCGs 
to account through the IAF, the latter is also the framework based on which NHSE is held to account by 
representative bodies ‗above‘ it. 
[Figure 2] 
 
The IAF was published in 2013 and refreshed in 2015. In 2016, it was modified and strengthened to take ―an 
enhanced and more central place in the overall arrangements for public accountability of the NHS‖ (NHS England 
2016, p. 5). The focus of the modified framework is on ‗practical support rather than assurance and monitoring‘ 
and CCG are assessed under four domains (Better Health, Better Care, Sustainability, and Leadership) and six 
clinical priorities (mental health, dementia, learning disabilities, cancer, diabetes, and maternity) comprising 60 
indicators across 29 areas.  
 
5 | METHODS AND DATA COLLECTION  
To build a detailed picture of the governance arrangements of this delivery model and be able to describe the 
specificities involved in hybridity, we contend there is value in exploring the realities of organisational members 
‗on the ground‘ (see, e.g., Krøtel and Villadsen 2016). Policy actors, under managerialism, are occupied with the 
excessive formalisation of organisational processes and spend much of their time engaging with systems of 
control, audit, inspection and review (Butterfield, Edwards, and Woodall 2004). At the same time, local policy 
practitioners act as ‗civic entrepreneurs‘ (Durose 2011), working to reconcile national priorities with community 
demands. Civic entrepreneurs shape policy through engagement with local communities, local knowledge, and a 
logic of enabling and fixing. As they act to reconcile competing interests, stakeholders, and policies, public sector 
work become more akin to policy entrepreneurship rather than bureaucracy (Oborn, Barrett, and Exworthy 2011).  
To explore this, Brodkin (2008) suggested adopting a ‗street-level‘ approach to accountability. A practice 
approach provides a framework to analyse accountability from ‗inside out‘, unpacking not only governance 
structures but also the practices that shape local experience. Indeed, as argued by anthropologists and critical 
accountants, understanding organizational-level behaviour is at the heart of understanding accountability 
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(Strathern 2000). Thus, in this paper we set to bring these elements together. We analyse the performance 
accountability arrangements instituted to govern a new hybrid service delivery model and explore challenges 
ensuing during implementation. We focus on the interface between the mechanisms of accountability and their 
intended or unintended consequences ‗on the ground‘ so to offer a more nuanced, or granular view of the sort of 
hybridity that exists in these arrangements.  
To achieve this and we build on a wider project, commissioned by the Department of Health, to explore the 
development of primary care co-commissioning in England (McDermott et al. 2018). For this paper, we focus on 
the implementation and delivery experience of four CCGs across England (Table 1). These organisations were 
chosen following a national survey of CCGs which included 147 CCGs‘ application documents, provided to us by 
NHSE with CCGs‘ agreement. The four were chosen to provide maximum variety along several dimensions, 
including: geography (north, south and central England); size; enthusiasm related to uptake of new responsibilities 
(early adopters vs those more reluctant); and engagement with other national reform initiatives. 
 
[Table 1] 
 
Our data collection and analysis included observation of meetings, interviews with key informants and analysis 
of documents. Meeting observation comprised attendance at 74 meetings (approx. 111 hours of observation), 
including a variety of operational and strategic meetings associated with primary care co-commissioning. To fully 
appreciate the realities of change ‗on the ground‘, we also conducted 42 face-to-face interviews with CCG 
employees directly involved in welfare planning and decision-making such as the Lay Chair, Primary Care 
Manager, Head of Contracts, Head of Quality, Head of Estates, Head of Engagement, Local Medical Council 
representative, and representatives of local public engagement bodies such as Healthwatch. We also interviewed 
the CCGs‘ Governing Body Chair, Accountable Officer, and Chief Finance Officer. Document analysis included 
a detailed analysis of governance and regulatory documents related to primary care co-commissioning, including 
local documents setting out roles and responsibilities as well as the IAF. 
Our analytic approach involved initial thematic coding of both interview transcripts and observational 
fieldnotes. Initial a priori codes were based upon our appreciation of relevant policy issues and literature, with 
additional codes arising from the data discussed and agreed by the research team. Coded segments relevant to 
accountability relationships were then extracted and further scrutinised and related to relevant sections of the 
examined documents. Together, these served to construct an understanding of the regulatory framework 
governing CCGs‘ operation and its relation to broader questions of public sector hybridity. The following sections 
are based upon this extensive analysis, with data extracts provided which illustrate the points made.  
 
6 | HYBRID ACCOUNTABILITY OBLIGATIONS IN CCGS 
When considering the governance model of CCGs using the framework of public accountability, it becomes 
difficult to pinpoint accountability obligations in a clear manner. The accountability actor is clearly defined as the 
CCG, with the off-the-board PCCC taking on the role on behalf of the organisation.  Information sources for 
performance monitoring (the What question of accountability) and consequences of failing to provide assurance 
are also clear, with the IAF setting out a wide range of performance metrics and a variety of potential 
interventions should these not be achieved. Nonetheless, whilst accountability with regards outcomes may be 
clear, the IAF and other associated CCG governance mechanisms introduce uncertainty in terms of the 
accountability obligations to a forum. Our first main finding is that accountability becomes hybrid as it places the 
accountability actor in a dual-nature relationship with its various stakeholders. We turn to explore this in more 
depth.  
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6.1 | Vertical forums, horizontal relationships: Informalising formal obligations 
CCGs operate in the field of primary care commissioning by power of delegation, with NHSE retaining the 
statutory responsibility for this function. Thus, their main accountability forum is NHSE. The accountability 
obligation between the two would thus be expected to be vertical and formal. That is, it might be expected that 
NHSE would be ‗above‘ CCGs in the chain of answerability and that the account given by CCGs to the national 
body is mandatory, explicit and formalised. 
However, where one would expect to find clear demarcations that could limit discretion and manage the way 
policy might be shaped ‗at the street-level‘ by practitioners, in practice the accountability mechanism is promoted 
in relevant documents as a conversational tool: ―The framework is intended as a focal point for joint work, 
support and dialogue between NHS England and CCGs‖ (NHS England 2016, p. 8). Instead of using an 
authoritative language that marks how CCGs‘ autonomy is to be limited by the accountability mechanism, the 
IAF document speaks of ―providing indicators for adoption‖ (p.2) or providing ―a reasonable degree of balance in 
illuminating the future agenda‖ (p. 6). In a Post-NPM managerial style, NHSE stated intentions in designing the 
framework are to ―empower CCGs to deliver the transformation necessary to achieve [service improvement]‖ and 
its focus is ―therefore on practical support, rather than assurance and monitoring‖ (p.10). This vague and 
convoluted description makes it hard to consider this accountability mechanism as a framework at all, leaving 
much to be desired in terms of formalising the relationship between NHSE and the organisations to which it has 
delegated authority. Consequently, the formality that is meant to limit the manoeuvrability of front-line policy 
implementers becomes reliant on human judgement as it is acknowledged that ―a critical factor in the success of 
the new framework will be the quality of the relationships between the NHS England local teams and CCGs.‖ 
(p.8) 
The reliance on relationships as a guarantor for what would usually be a formal accountability relationship is 
of relevance because of the nature of CCGs. As mentioned, CCGs were specifically set up as clinically-led 
organisations which would take over the responsibilities previously held by managerially-led Primary Care 
Trusts, with many managers leaving their posts in the transition. With this loss of expertise, and the continuing 
uncertainty about the distribution of responsibilities in the new system, individuals‘ past experiences and 
relationships became pivotal for their day-to-day work. This was particularly evident as CCG staff struggled to 
maintain a relationship with the national body NHSE, especially during the turbulent initial period of taking over 
new welfare responsibilities.  
Thus, accountability obligations became hybrid as governance arrangements manifested a formal 
accountability forum that articulates its demands as if it was informal. This was exemplified by a manager, 
seconded from NHSE to work in a CCG, who describes the importance of ‗who to call‘: 
I do think [my past experience with NHSE] has been advantageous, because I’ve got a good relationship, [I’m] 
still employed by NHS England, where you do find an issue you can work through that with somebody that you 
know and somebody that you trust. I think we’re quite open at being able to pick up the phone to each other and 
saying oh, you might have missed this or you need to do that. [Manager ID10] 
The relationship between the accountability forum and the accountability actor became dependent on past 
relationships of the individual manager, facilitated by the hybrid employment model of secondment from NHSE 
to the CCG. Such dependence on informal relationships (an employee happens to be seconded, thus allowing for 
better compliance on the part of the CCG) was repeated many times in our data, with managers in both interviews 
and observed meetings drawing on their personal and past acquaintances and skills to carry out their roles. This 
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may have detrimental consequences on operations, and thus on CCGs ability to meet their accountability 
outcomes, as much of what CCGs do depend on prior approval or input from the national body: 
I think they’re suffering perhaps, NHSE, generally suffering from the lack of capacity to react and respond 
quickly and efficiently…. Today was an example of that. NHSE has been silent for the last two months on certain 
issues that we’ve been raising, whether it’s TB screening or whether it’s flu vaccinations, whatever, or asylum 
seekers and refugees, and NHSE has been absent. (Lay member, ID14) 
With CCGs decision-making depending on an NHSE under pressure, their ability to function becomes dependant 
on prior, individual relationships with NHSE rather than a formalised, structured relationship. As observed during 
executive meetings in CCG-B, for example, the Risk Register was frequently filled with issues presumably under 
CCG control awaiting an NHSE response, clearly marking the relationship with the national body as a risk factor 
due to uncertainty.  
Thus, with a design underpinned by a partnership rationale (as set out in the IAF documents), and exacerbated 
by the lack of primary care expertise in CCGs, in practice the latter are simultaneously ‗below‘ but also equal — 
hence horizontal (informal) — partners to NHSE (figure 3), making accountability obligations hybrid, a case of 
both-and.  
 
[Figure 3] 
 6.2 | Horizontal forums, vertical relationships: Formalising informal obligations 
As well as hybridising accountability obligations between CCGs and NHSE, the IAF further hybridises 
accountability by blurring the boundaries of formality and informality between CCGs and other healthcare bodies, 
first and foremost its membership. The IAF sets out how vertical accountability is meant to be operationalised – 
i.e., how NHSE as the delegating body will hold the delegated body to account. However, as mentioned, CCGs 
are membership organisations with members being GP practices. Thus, the dynamic between the national body 
NHSE and the welfare delivery organisations has changed with the delegation of responsibility for primary care 
commissioning: 
Well it goes back to earlier conversation, doesn’t it, around membership organisations? I guess all the time that 
[primary care] was commissioned by NHS England and if you’re sat as a GP member on the governing body or 
you’re a GP practice who want to do what they want, if primary care wasn’t what you wanted it to be, you could 
all [i.e. executive and membership] be on exactly the same side and say that terrible NHS England aren’t very 
good at this, are they? ….. I guess the bit that could change is now it’s delegated, I think our governing body and 
members will feel accountable to all of their membership who are absolutely passionate about improving primary 
care and we now have the tools to do it, we have the budget to do it, it is our local decisions. So that feels a bit 
more like the membership are going to hold us to account, that’s something they’re really passionate about 
(Manager ID42). 
Thus, while NHSE is the vertical forum with formal responsibility to hold CCGs to account over primary care, 
the place of the membership is unclear. For one, they might be considered as stakeholders within the framework 
of public accountability, thus forming an informal, horizontal obligation with the CCGs. But with GPs and GP 
practices formally members of CCGs, this relationship is fuzzy, and there is a formal expectation, and even 
motivation, to be held to account. Instead of a clear demarcation between the formal obligations to bodies ‗above‘ 
it in the chain of answerability, CCG practitioners are also formally obligated towards their service delivering 
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members, with a set of constitutional documents establishing relevant roles and responsibilities. This was evident 
in our observation of CCG meetings, in which ‗the membership‘ figured as an important accountability forum, 
always present as an invisible and assumed audience for discussions and decisions who could, according to 
CCGs‘ constitutions, remove CCG officers with whom they were displeased. It also featured in interviews, 
whereby CCG members have taken an almost formalized role in commissioning planning:  
Up until this year we had seven commissioning networks which we funded from the member[ship]. Through the 
membership they agreed on the configuration. It is seven geographical areas with a clinical chair that we funded 
and they…that was the membership. We called it membership led commissioning.  So that was them, on our 
behalf, identifying areas to transform and we gave them each a theme.  (Manager ID12) 
Furthermore, the performance accountability mechanism states that assessment of CCGs compliance will rely 
on information provided by organizations that are not vertically ‗above‘ CCGs within the delegation chain, 
including neighbouring CCGs, local Healthwatch (responsible for patient voice), or Local Authorities (via Health 
and Wellbeing Boards). In practice, the way in which CCGs decide to operationalise their mandate over welfare 
delivery will be judged by those organisations and will affect the judgement made by NHSE about CCGs‘ 
performance. While CCGs‘ main accountability is vertically to NHSE, the IAF ties the satisfaction of local 
partners into the accountability mechanism and creates a situation in which clear prioritisation between national 
policies and local arrangements is not clear. These bodies that do not stand ‗above‘ CCGs in terms of control and 
command nor do they have precedence in terms of policy formulation, but nonetheless are named in the IAF as 
sources of ‗insight‘ upon which NHSE will (or will not) establish its confidence in a CCG. The lack of a clear 
demarcation of authority between CCGs‘ actions and other bodies in the system (Gore et al. 2018) makes it 
particularly difficult for managers to judge how and in what capacity stakeholders should be taken into 
consideration. While ‗diagonal accountability‘ has been proposed as additional conceptualisation of prevailing 
relations, the latter is about a formalised relationship between public bodies and other agencies, usually regulators 
who are not ‗above‘ them in the delegation chain (Schillemans 2015). In this case, by contrast, the IAF takes non-
regulatory stakeholders into account in a formalised way. It thus ends up formalising informal, horizontal 
relationships, introducing ambiguity and hybrid accountability like that observed in the relationship between 
CCGs and NHSE.  
 
[Figure 4] 
  
7 | HYBRID ACCOUNTABILITY OBLIGATIONS AND PRACTITIONER 
DISCRETION  
Our second main finding is that within this new hybrid delivery model, hybrid accountability obligations have 
become a source of practitioner discretion as CCG practitioners gained control and discretion over organisational 
practices that are external to the domain of healthcare, namely over the very domain of governance arrangements, 
the management of conflict of interest, and the distinction between what constitutes private and public matters. In 
this respect, Schillemans and Busuioc (2015) have observed behaviours of ‗forum drift‘ by which the 
accountability forum chooses, for this reason or another, not to hold an accountability actor to account. In our 
case, the accountability forum — NHSE — does choose to hold public practitioners to account, but, importantly, 
and due to motivations in line with ‗new‘ administrative logics of inter- and intra-organisation cooperation and 
accommodation, hybrid accountability leads to a kind of ‗forum drift‘ whereby practitioner discretion is being 
extended rather than controlled. Even though the IAF, as a performance accountability mechanism, is meant to 
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restrict discretion by specifying the health outcomes expected from CCGs (patient choice, mortality rates, 
diabetes, access to services, etc.), it is also the same mechanism that measures CCGs on the quality of their 
governance and oversight arrangements (e.g., how they operationalise conflicts of interest). This means that the 
governance structures of welfare delivery are included as one of the performance outcomes CCGs are monitored 
on. With unclear relationships and lack of detail, the PCCC, an executive committee comprising managers, GPs, 
and lay representatives, ended up deciding on matters which are at the heart of the relationship between the state 
and the citizen: what is a private affair; what might be regarded as a conflict of interest; or who is involved in 
welfare planning decision making. 
7.1 | Discretion over governance structure 
The first managerial discretion drift has to do with the structures of welfare delivery. In exercising their primary 
care co-commissioning delegated functions, CCGs are required to establish a corporate decision-making Primary 
Care Commissioning Committee (PCCC). NHSE has published a model Terms of Reference (ToR) for this 
committee, but it does not dictate the what should be included in a PCCC ToR. Hence CCGs are given the 
flexibility to articulate their PCCC‘s responsibilities, its membership, quorum, schedules, geographic coverage, 
meetings frequency, procurement, and decision-making. While this leaves room for local specificity and expert 
input, this also generates ambiguity in relation to what is expected from CCGs, or how best to define 
responsibilities, domains of operation, and lines of accountability. The hybrid nature of obligation to NHSE and 
additional stakeholders, together with the fact that the accountability mechanism does not specify the standards by 
which governance arrangements are to be judged lead to a situation in which CCGs have to use their discretion on 
these issues – they had to come up with their own structures for welfare delivery. This was evident when 
considering the governance structure put in place by each CCG (set out in Table 2) (Correct at time of data 
collection; may have changed since).  
 
[Table 2] 
 
Thus, in practice, the setting up of primary care co-commissioning functions within CCGs has generated 
different approaches, designs, and ways of working with each CCG developing internal procedures that fit with its 
historical contingencies and local stakeholders. CCG executives, in-charge of health-related outcomes, were also 
able to choose whether, for example, decisions about health care should be made every month or quarterly. More 
importantly, they get to decide on who needs to be present for a quorum to be met, whether to invite the Local 
Medical Council representative, or which members of the CCG executive get to vote.  
7.2 | Discretion over conflict-of-interest policy implementation 
The IAF requires CCGs to submit an annual self-certification that they have a ‗clear‘ conflict of interest 
management policy in place. This legislative framework (section 140 of the Act) sets out the minimum 
requirements in terms of what CCGs must do in terms of managing conflicts of interest, and NHSE published 
guidance for CCGs. This guidance, stated, amongst other things,  that CCGs must maintain registers of interest, 
make arrangements for public access to those registers, and ―make arrangements requiring the prompt declaration 
of interests by the persons specified (members and employees) and ensure that these interests are entered into the 
relevant register‖ (NHS England 2014a, p. 10). Part of the IAF, then, is to judge whether CCGs are meeting these 
guidelines. As opposed to health outcomes for which the performance accountability mechanism is highly 
specific, the IAF does not offer any details about the standards by which ‗good‘ governance is to be evaluated. 
CCGs need to provide assurance as to the existence of ‗effective systems […] to ensure compliance with [their] 
statutory functions‘, but what this actually entails is left unspecified. This is of particular importance in the case of 
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CCGs as the organisational governance arrangements for the delivery of primary care co-commissioning were 
either not specified exhaustively by NHSE and the government or, when specified, created a ‗structural conflict of 
interest‘ that is very hard to manage (Moran et al. 2017). 
The management of conflicts of interest was a prominent feature of our observations. Our case study sites 
adopted different approaches. All our case study CCGs maintained and/or published a Register of Interests on 
their websites. Three of our case study sites additionally published a Register of Gifts and Hospitality. One site 
recruited GPs from an outside area so to ensure impartiality of professional input, whilst other sites either 
included GP members who hold different contracts or included GPs as non-voting members to ensure the clinical 
voice was not lost when the local GP members must leave the room during discussions which present conflicts of 
interest. We observed how CCGs initially encountered difficulty in defining who are the ―members and 
employees‖ who should declare interest. The guidance was ambiguous and did not make clear who are the 
―persons specified (members and employees)‖, as described by one of our interviewees: 
Well, before what we did was we only looked at people involved in commissioning from member practices […].  
We didn’t have a register of all GP partners.  The new guidance is every single member of staff, whether they’re a 
GP or whether they’re a cleaner, they will be declaring their address and they’ll be published.  [Manager ID13] 
We also observed the ambiguity over the definition of ―close relative and close friends‖ and how members of 
the committee made sense of this ambiguity with considerable time in meetings devoted to discussing these 
issues. Another recurring theme across our case study sites was around risk registers. Although what was on the 
register can be briefly discussed in public meetings, the details of the risks may contain ‗sensitive‘, ‗confidential‘, 
and/or ‗controversial‘ information which could be interpreted as politically sensitive such as closure of a GP 
practice or the quality of provider services. Hence distributions of this type of information were carefully 
managed to avoid misinterpretation and managers used their discretion over what constituted ‗good‘ governance 
in this domain. 
7.3 | Discretion over transparency and publicity 
The Terms of Reference for delegated commissioning stipulates that primary care co-commissioning meetings 
should be held in public (as distinct from being public meetings) but also make provision to exclude the public 
from meetings in circumstances such as: 
whenever publicity would be prejudicial to the public interest by reason of the confidential nature of the business 
to be transacted or for other special reasons stated in the resolution and arising from the nature of that business 
or of the proceedings or for any other reason permitted by the Public Bodies (Admission to Meetings) Act 1960 as 
amended or succeeded from time to time. (NHS England 2014b) 
The requirement to hold these meetings in public has created the need for the committee to discuss some of 
their agenda items in private. Our case study CCGs divided meetings into ‗public‘ (where members of the public 
could attend) and ‗private‘ (where members of the public were excluded). This has caused dilemma around the 
notions of what can and should be discussed in public and what in private. This again was a prominent feature of 
the meetings we observed. In general, when in doubt members of the committee would defer to the Chair of 
PCCC for clarification, move the discussion to the private section of the meeting at the Chair‘s discretion, or take 
the discussion ‗out of the room‘.  
We also saw managers‘ discretion in discussions about how to manage information coming to PCCC public 
meetings from Operational Groups that hold private meetings. Framing reports to overcome the incongruence of 
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simultaneously being communicative and transparent but respectful of confidential and sensitive information was 
a source of confusion as the following extract illustrates:  
 
Chair of Audit Committee: These [PCOG - Primary Care Operational Group] notes don’t say much! 
Primary Care Contract Support: PCOG is not a public meeting. The PCCC is and the material is in the public 
domain. 
Governance Support: Sensitive information can be discussed in PCOG. If we receive a Freedom of Information 
request, then we need to provide it all. 
Chair of Audit Committee: I don’t understand. 
NHSE representative: Something just being sensitive or awkward doesn’t justify. 
Chief Finance Officer: we’ll have a think about the mechanics. [Primary Care Commissioning Committee 
meeting, M42] 
 
Despite the anxiety surrounding public meetings, all our case study CCGs attempted to make the agenda and 
papers for PCCC meetings publicly available. However, there were occasions where these were not available in 
advance of the meetings. On the other hand, even when public meetings were advertised, members of the public 
did not always attend. The lack of public attendance had consequently led one of our case study sites to run some 
of their meetings in an informal way by mixing their public and private discussions in an informal order, 
contingently and in an emergent manner. Thus, the hybrid accountability mechanism extended practitioners (in 
our case, managers) discretion into the domain of governance.  
 
8 | CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we joined calls for the further specification of what hybridity might mean in the context of 
accountability. Rather than asking about accountability within hybrid organisations or hybrid welfare structures 
alone, we proposed to ask about accountability itself and the ways it could be understood as hybrid within a case 
study of reform. In our case, a new delivery model aimed at ‗liberating‘ professionals by situating clinicians at the 
centre of healthcare planning and commissioning resulted in a situation of hybrid obligations in which 
accountability forums were both in a position of a vertical and a horizontal relationship with the accountability 
actor. Interestingly, such hybridisation of obligations, whereby uncertainty reigns over expectations and 
responsibilities, opened spaces for practitioner‘s manoeuvrability which are directly related to the notion of 
democratic accountability and the boundaries of the public sector. Due to the uncertainty inherent in the model, in 
practice it became a matter for practitioners working within locally formed, locally-oriented, member-led, and, 
more importantly, unelected organisations to decide on the shape and detail of healthcare commissioning 
governance structures. While granting professionals more discretion in shaping policy and its implementation 
might be an intended result of reform, it is important to note that under-articulation of the structures of 
governance and the demands directed at those gaining further discretion can lead to what we termed ‗managerial 
discretion drift‘ and the dislocation of discretion to additional elements within the welfare system. This has direct 
bearing to public accountability, as it becomes harder for the public to realise why welfare delivery models take 
the shape they do, and due to whose involvement.       
 Our analysis, thus, further unpacks our understanding of hybrid accountability by suggesting a focus on 
accountability obligations as the analytical ‗grid‘ within which hybridity happens. It points to the fruitfulness of 
asking about hybridity in relation to the analytical frameworks of accountability already developed in the 
literature, in our case that of Public Accountability, and offers insights into the unintended consequences of 
hybridity and its possible effects on practitioners‘ response to hybrid obligations. Moreover, our focus on 
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obligations hybridity and the findings it generated lead to two contributions to the scholarly discussion of 
accountability: one in terms of extending our understanding of circumstances in which a diminishing public 
accountability might occur, and second in terms of the domains to which hybridity happens.   
In relation to the broader discussion of accountability in the public sector, the focus on hybrid accountability 
obligations enabled us to present findings that further support a diminishing of public accountability, while 
pointing to new avenues through which this phenomenon might occur. Accountability scholarship has 
demonstrated how public bodies are today subject to conflating demands posed by ever growing webs of 
accountability (Page, 2006). With extant research mostly focused on goal disparity between stakeholders or 
between the kinds of accountability concurrent stakeholder might ask for, the diminishing of public accountability 
is usually attributed to the pull of different organisations. In this vein, previous work demonstrates how demands 
for political accountability posed by one stakeholder might be in conflict with the demands for vertical 
accountability posed by others (Kim 2017), how local stakeholders might pose rival demands to those enacted 
through regulation bodies, or how the very fabric of the executive branch is now fragmented into various agencies 
posing contradictory obligations on their clients/constituent organisations (Radin, 2010). By focusing on the issue 
of hybrid accountability obligations, our findings add to these accounts by demonstrating how the very same 
organisation, in our case both NHSE and local stakeholders, might pose accountability obligations that are 
themselves hybrid, not clearly demarcated in terms of their formality and informality or the extent to which they 
are mandatory. This suggests that even in cases whereby no new organisations have been introduced, there might 
still be a diminishing of public accountability. We encourage further empirical investigation of this avenue.  
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Table 1. Site characteristics 
 CCG-A CCG-B CCG-C CCG-D 
Region 
 
North of England  Midlands & East of 
England 
South of England North of England 
Patient 
Population 
Over 40 practices with 
population approx. 
350K 
Over 100 practices with 
population approx. 
550K 
Over 20 practices with 
population approx. 
150K 
Over 40 practices with 
population approx. 
250K 
Number of 
Meetings 
Attended 
13 24 6 31 
Number of 
Interviews  
7 13 11 11 
 
Table 2. PCCC Arrangements in Practice 
 CCG-A CCG-B CCG-C CCG-D 
Composition of 
Executive Body 
Responsible for 
Primary Care 
Commissioning 
Three CCG Lay 
Members  
Two CCG Lay 
Members and one 
Lay Advisor  
Two CCG Lay 
Members  
Two CCG Lay 
Members and one 
Lay Advisor 
CCG Governing 
Body (GB) Nurse 
CCG GB Nurse CCG GB Nurse CCG GB Nurse 
 
CCG GB 
Secondary Care 
Consultant 
CCG GB 
Secondary Care 
Consultant 
CCG GB 
Secondary Care 
Consultant 
CCG GB 
Secondary Care 
Consultant 
 
Independent 
Clinician 
Clinical Lead for 
Primary Care 
Development 
CCG GB GP 
Members  
CCG GB Practice 
representatives 
 
CCG Chief 
Operating Officer 
 CCG Chief 
Operating Officer 
CCG Chief 
Operating Officer 
 
CCG Chief Finance 
Officer 
CCG Chief Finance 
Officer 
CCG Chief Finance 
Officer 
CCG Chief Finance 
Officer 
 
 CCG Head of 
Contracting 
CCG Head of 
Contracting 
 
 
CCG Chief Officer  CCG Chief Officer  CCG GB Practice 
Manager 
 
Non-Voting 
Members 
Health and 
Wellbeing Board 
representative  
 
 
Health and 
Wellbeing Board 
representative 
Health and 
Wellbeing Board 
representative 
 
Healthwatch 
representative 
Healthwatch 
representative 
Healthwatch 
representative 
 
 
NHS England 
representative 
NHS England 
representative 
NHS England 
representative 
NHS England 
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